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Recent Employment Law Decisions of the Seventh Circuit
and the Indiana Courts
TERRY A. BETHEL*
INTRODUCTION
A vast array of legal actions affect the employment relationship.
On the federal level, the courts review decisions of such administrative
agencies as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). The courts
decide discrimination cases filed under such statutes as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and they
protect statutory rights granted by such legislative enactments as the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). State courts, too,
move in a significant number of areas that touch the relationship between
employer and employee. They hear cases involving state and local em-
ployees, worker's compensation claims, and common law actions under
various wrongful discharge theories. No survey of this short length could
comprehensively review each decision from the state courts and the
federal courts that cover Indiana. What follows, then, is not an exhaustive
accounting of everything the courts accomplished during 1992, but a
sampling of their more important and interesting actions.
I. INDIANA CASES
A. Employment Evaluations
In Bals v. Verduzco,' the Indiana Supreme Court opened the door
for defamation actions based on information contained in intracompany
employee evaluations. The Inland Steel Company terminated Bals fol-
lowing a series of negative evaluations by his supervisor, Verduzco. Bals
then filed suit, arguing both defamation and interference with an em-
ployment relationship. The trial court granted summary judgment on
the latter claim (an action not contested before the supreme court), but
allowed the defamation action to proceed to trial. However, the trial
court granted judgment for the defendant at the close of plaintiff's case,
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington. The author expresses his appreciation to Dirck Stahl, class of
1993, for his research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. 600 N.E.2d 1353 (Ind. 1992).
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deciding that an intracompany evaluation was not the kind of publication
that would support a defamation action. The court of appeals affirmed.2
The supreme court noted the conflict that exists among jurisdictions
over this issue. Some states refuse to view intracorporate communications
as a publication, reasoning that the corporation is merely communicating
with itself. Others, however, overlook the fiction of a single corporate
personality and recognize that corporate officers "remain individuals
with ... opinions that might be affected just as surely as those of other
employees by the spread of injurious falsehoods." 3 The court aligned
Indiana with these states.
Interestingly, the court found support for its position in the Indiana
Constitution, which provides that "every person" shall have a remedy
for injury "to him in his person, property, or reputation."" The court
said there was no counterpart to this protection in the federal consti-
tution.5 Also influential was another provision of the Indiana Constitution
that protects the right of free speech, but mandates accountability for
those who abuse it.6 Most persuasive, however, was the court's forthright
recognition of an employee's interest in his or her reputation, especially
in the work place:
Upon employment, an individual does not relinquish the value
of a good reputation. To the contrary, a person's suitability for
continued employment and advancement at work may be sub-
stantially influenced by the reputation one earns. When intra-
company communications injure an employee's occupational
reputation, the result may be among the most injurious of
defamations .1
Although this decision clears the way for employee actions against
superiors-and presumably against corporate employers-for falsehoods
in evaluations, the path is not entirely unobstructed. The court recognized
that a qualified privilege attaches "to protect personnel evaluation in-
formation communicated in good faith." ' This substantially tempers the
likelihood of liability, because such reports will be privileged unless
2. 564 N.E.2d 307, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
3. Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1355. The court said this approach was consistent with
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
4. Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1355 (quoting IND. CONST. art. I, § 12).
5. Id.
6. "No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion,
or restricting the right to speak, write or print freely on any subject whatever: but for
abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." IND. CONST. art. I, § 9.
7. Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1355.
8. Id. at 1356.
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motivated primarily by ill will, publicized excessively, or made without
belief or without grounds for belief in their truth.9 Nevertheless, Bals
v. Verduzco is a warning to employers that evaluations and other per-
sonnel reports must be supportable by facts and cannot be used by
superiors for vindictive purposes.
B. Wrongful Discharge
Although not actually an employment case, Keystone Carbon Co.
v. Black'0 is an important case for those who work as independent
contractors under agency agreements and, by analogy, perhaps to em-
ployees as well. Lowell Black had been a manufacturer's representative
for the defendant Keystone for twenty-nine years. He was Keystone's
exclusive sales representative in Indiana and Kentucky. Beginning in the
mid-1980s, Black developed a substantial account for Keystone's product
with General Electric's Louisville facility.1" Although sales of Keystone's
products were expected to be flat in 1986, Black's sales were expected
to increase, largely due to the G.E. account.
Keystone terminated Black's agency agreement in March 1986, relying
on a provision of the contract that allowed either party to do so "for
.any reason" upon sixty days notice. Although Keystone alleged that it
terminated Black because of the need to reduce expenses, it admitted
that Black worked solely on commission and did not receive expense
payments. Moreover, Keystone replaced Black with the son of a corporate
executive and paid him expenses, salary, and commission.
Black filed suit claiming that the termination was in bad faith and
had cost him approximately $350,000 in commissions over four years.
He recovered $160,000 in a jury verdict and Keystone appealed, con-
tending that Indiana law does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful
termination of an at will agency agreement.
Although the court of appeals did not say so expressly, Black had
apparently based his action on the court's 1975 opinion in Montgomery
Ward and Co. v. Tackett. 2 In any event, most of the opinion in Keystone
attempts to recast what the court had said in Tackett. Like Keystone,
the Tackett case involved the termination of an agency relationship,
though unlike Keystone, the agency agreement in Tackett did not allow
9. Bals was unable to overcome the defense of qualified privilege. Although he
alleged that Verduzco's reports were made without belief or without grounds for belief
in their truth, the court said that he had failed to present any evidence to support those
allegations. Id. at 1357.
10. 599 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
11. At least by 1986, G.E. was expected to be among Keystone's 10 largest
customers. Id. at 215.
12. 323 N.E.2d 242 (1975).
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termination for any reason. Rather, Montgomery Ward had the right
to terminate its agency agreement with the Tacketts if they failed to
follow "current policies and procedures," a provision Ward claimed the
right to invoke because the Tacketts had submitted incorrect inventory
clearance documents. Ward, in fact, recovered a judgment for Tackett's
failure to pay for merchandise received.
Nevertheless, the court said in Tackett that a "principal owes the
agent the obligation of exercising good faith in the incidents of their
relationship ... [and] a contract of agency carries an implied obligation
of the principal to do nothing to thwart the effectiveness of the agent."' 3
The court found there was evidence that Montgomery Ward had failed
to exercise good faith in resolving problems in the relationship between
the parties.14 Montgomery Ward, however, argued that even if a principal
could be liable for revoking an agency, the contract at issue did not
give either side the "absolute right" to continue the relationship. In
particular, the agency was terminable for Tackett's failure to follow
proper procedures.' 5
The court's reaction to this argument gave hope to disappointed
agents such as Black:
In no respect do we question the validity of the terms governing
termination of the franchise agreement. However, we do not
believe it consistent with sound public policy to permit Ward
to employ those provisions as a shield against liability for ter-
mination accomplished in breach of its duty to exercise good
faith. 6
Although not a typical employment case, this sounded remarkably like
the public policy exception to the employment at will rule, largely spurned
by the Indiana courts.' 7
In Keystone, the court took it all back. It acknowledged that its
opinion in Tackett had created "confusion" and that the opinion could
13. Id. at 246.
14. Id. at 245. Tackett did not deny that he had claimed credit improperly, but
he alleged that his actions were motivated by inaction on Ward's part in resolving certain
payment difficulties.
15. Id. at 246.
16. Id. at 247.
17. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 387 (Conn. 1980)
("It would be difficult to maintain that the right to discharge an employee hired at will
is so fundamentally different from other contract rights that its exercise is never subject
to judicial scrutiny regardless of how outrageous, how violative of public policy, the
employer's conduct may be.").
The Indiana Supreme Court has embraced the public policy exception only in limited
circumstances; see, e.g., McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, 517 N.E.2d 390 (1988).
[Vol. 26:1065
EMPLOYMENT LAW
be read to sanction an action like the one brought by Black. However,
the Indiana Supreme Court had made it clear that "an 'at will' agency
contract may be terminated without cause or regardless of bad faith."' 8
The court said its decision in Tackett was actually a holding that
Montgomery Ward's termination for the audit discrepancies was "pre-
textual," an odd characterization given the fact that the jury had upheld
Ward's claim against the Tacketts.19 It seems more likely that the Tackett
court had meant just what it said: notwithstanding Ward's right to
terminate the agreement, it still owed its agent the obligation of good
faith.
After Keystone, no such obligation can be implied. "When the rights
of the parties are controlled by an express contract, recovery cannot be
based on a theory implied in law." 20 This case not only frustrates the
expectations of agents like Black, it further demonstrates the resolve of
the Indiana courts to rebuff efforts to impose good faith obligations
on employers who hold their employees to at will relationships.
The court of appeals demonstrated similar dedication to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine in Griffin v. Elkhart General Hospital, Inc. 2t
The hospital employed plaintiff as a construction manager under a written
agreement which provided, in part:
a) The position, as we discussed, is projected to enjoy a duration
of approximately three years. I am unable to guarantee a specific
timeframe for the position, nor to predict a precise termination
point.
b) Your ability to maintain this position will, as with all positions
at EGH, be predicated on your performance in this new ca-
pacity .22
The hospital terminated the plaintiff nine months later. Griffin sued,
claiming a violation of the written agreement, as supplemented by oral
assurances from a vice president. 23 The trial court granted summary
judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed.
Even if the court had treated the oral assurances as a guarantee of
employment for a specific term, they probably would not have survived
the statute of frauds. Even so, the court might have constructed similar
18. Keystone Carbon Co. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 585 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
22. Id. at 724.
23. The plaintiff testified in a deposition that the vice president told him he would
be employed for three years "no problem" and that his term of employment could have
"lasted longer, 10 years, 12 years." Id. at 725.
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guarantees out of the contract portions reprinted above. Thus, although
the employer was unwilling to guarantee a specific term of employment,
it contracted to employ plaintiff for the duration of the building project,
which had a termination point that can be objectively ascertained. Thus,
the contract did not create the open-ended relationship to which the
employment at will rules typically apply.
The court noted that at least one other state had used similar
reasoning to circumvent the harshness of the rule,24 but it eschewed any
such innovation in Indiana. Instead, relying on ample precedent from
both its own opinions and those of the supreme court, the court declared
that only agreements for a definite term escape the at-will doctrine.
2
Tying plaintiff's employment to the completion of the construction project
did not satisfy the definite term requirement. 2
6
C. Collateral Estoppel
During 1992, Indiana courts also struggled with issues that have
often confronted-and confounded-the United States Supreme Court.
In Commissioner of Labor v. Talbert Manufacturing Co. ,27 the Com-
missioner filed an action on behalf of an employee named Bougher who
claimed that Talbert had discharged him in retaliation for filing an
Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Aact (IOSHA)2s complaint.
While the lawsuit was pending, the employer and union arbitrated a
contractual claim based on the same facts under the collective bargaining
agreement that covered Bougher. The arbitrator found no merit in the
grievance. Subsequently, the trial court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment, ruling that the arbitrator's decision precluded
further litigation under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel.2 9
A divided court of appeals reversed.3 0 The majority (Judges Staton
and Hoffman) took refuge in a series of United States Supreme Court
24. Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 715 P.2d 1017 (Idaho 1986).
25. Griffin, 585 N.E.2d at 724.
26. The court of appeals also displayed a similar disposition to reject any erosion
of traditional at will employment rules in more traditional employment actions. In Mehling
v. Dubois County Farm Bureau, 601 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), the court reiterated
the rule that Indiana does not recognize a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts, and advised potential plaintiffs to address for reform to the
legislature or the supreme court. In Wheeler v. Balemaster, 601 N.E.2d 447 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992), the court adhered to the notion that employers in at will relationships are
free to change the terms of employment unilaterally, leaving employees with the dubious
alternatives of quitting or accepting the changes.
27. 593 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
28. See IND. CODE § 22-8-1.1-38.1 (1988).




opinions that had considered similar issues, and one Seventh Circuit
case decided on virtually identical facts. The starting point was the
Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,31 in which
an employee lost an arbitration while a claim on the same facts was
under investigation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). The employee filed suit in federal court, claiming a violation
of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32
As in Talbert, the employer claimed that the prior arbitration award
should have preclusive effect, a position that found support among
established federal law. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting the dis-
tinction between the contractual rights enforced in arbitration and the
statutory rights protected by Title VII. The Court also questioned whether
arbitrators were expert in such questions of law and whether the informal
procedures of arbitration would adequately protect a plaintiff's statutory
rights." These same themes were repeated in two subsequent decisions,
which again pitted arbitration decisions against attempts to enforce stat-
utory rights judicially. 34
The Seventh Circuit decision is Marshall v. N.L. Industries,3 in
which an employee filed an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
complaint following his discharge for refusing to work in conditions he
believed to be unsafe. After an arbitrator had denied a similar claim
under the collective bargaining agreement, the Secretary of Labor filed
suit seeking, among other things, the employee's reinstatement. Relying
on Gardner-Denver, the Seventh Circuit said that occupational safety
and health legislation was intended to create individual rights broader
than those protected by a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the
court refused to give preclusive effect to the arbitration.
Those same observations were apt in Talbert. The Indiana Court
of Appeals was comfortably within the universe of federal cases dealing
with the same issue when it said "the rights afforded by the statute are
designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and insti-
tutions relating to employment discrimination. ' 36 That does not mean,
however, that its decision is free from controversy, as Judge Sullivan
pointed out in a long and thoughtful dissenting opinion.
What made the case difficult was not what the Supreme Court had
said in Gardner-Denver and like cases. Rather, the controversy arose
31. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
32. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I to -17 (1988).
33. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
34. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrantine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
35. 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).




from what the Court said in 1991, in its opinion in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp." There, the Court enforced the provisions of an
individual employment agreement that required an employee to submit
his age discrimination claim to arbitration rather than taking it to federal
court. Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was intended
by Congress to further important social goals, those goals were not
undermined by enforcing an agreement to arbitrate the claim.3" The
Federal Arbitration Act demonstrated the importance of the arbitral
forum and was a congressional attempt to ease the traditional hostility
of the judiciary toward arbitration.3 9
Certainly, there are differences between the kinds of arbitration at
issue in Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. Gardner-Denver involved arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement, in which arbitrators are assumed
to be expert in the enforcement of contract rights implemented by
majority rule. Labor contracts commonly exclude arbitrators from con-
struing the law or relying on what the Supreme Court has characterized
as their "own brand of industrial justice." 4 By contrast, the Gilmer
arbitration was to be convened under the Federal Arbitration Act, which
does not apply to labor arbitration. Moreover, unlike the situation in
Gardner-Denver, in which the employee was not actually a party to the
arbitration, the employee in Gilmer had expressly agreed to submit his
statutory claim to an arbitrator.
These were the distinctions drawn by the Supreme Court in Gilmer,
in which the employee had argued that it made no sense to force him
to arbitrate a claim when, under Gardner-Denver, the arbitration would
not preclude further federal court litigation. The Court, however, dis-
tinguished labor arbitration and pointed to the federal policy favoring
arbitration of statutory claims represented by the Federal Arbitration
Act.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sullivan had the courage to say
what the Supreme Court has yet to admit-that cases like Gardner-
Denver and Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc. ,4 represent
a "rationale [that] can be described as a basic distrust of the arbitration
system and a strong preference for judicial resolution of statutory claims. '"42
Judge Sullivan noted that the Indiana Supreme Court, which has recently
37. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
38. Id. at 1653.
39. Id.
40. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960).
41. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).




adopted Rules for Alternative Dispute Resolution, observed in the pre-
amble to those rules that "[tihe interests of the parties can be preserved
in settings other than the traditional judicial dispute resolution method." 43
That recognition, he said, should dispel the fears of "inadequacy or
unfairness" that influenced decisions like Gardner-Denver."
Judge Sullivan is surely right. The Supreme Court's characterization
of labor arbitration in cases like Gardner-Denver is unrealistic. It ignores
what labor arbitrators do and what the parties expect them to do.
Moreover, it portrays the aggrieved employee as an unwilling captive
of the union who is powerless to influence the course of the litigation.
Although Gilmer arose in a different setting, it raises hope that the
Supreme Court might someday substitute action for some of its favorable
rhetoric about arbitration. Because state courts are not bound by Gardner
Denver when employees seek to enforce state statutory rights, the court
of appeals missed an opportunity to do the same thing in Indiana.
D. Fair Share
Another troublesome issue at both the state and federal levels has
been the determination of so-called fair share fees, paid by nonmembers
for the union's representational efforts in collective bargaining and con-
tract enforcement. Cases involving such employees have often occupied
the courts' time, as was the case in Indiana in 1992. In January, two
districts of the court of appeals decided the same issues in different
ways, prompting the Indiana Supreme Court to grant transfer and settle
the matter.
The cases involved, among other issues, the question of how to
determine what portion of a union's expenditures are chargeable to
represented nonmembers. 41 A recent United States Supreme Court decision
established criteria for the assessment of a service fee on nonmember
public employees. 46 The expenses must be germane to the union's col-
lective bargaining role, justified by the policies eliminating free riders
and assuring labor peace, and they must not add significantly to the
burden of free speech "inherent in the allowance of a union or agency
43. Talbert, 593 N.E.2d at 1234.
44. Id.
45. Both federal and state collective bargaining laws adopt the so-called principle
of exclusive representation. Collective bargaining units are designated by naming groupings
of jobs. Everyone who holds one of those jobs is in the bargaining unit and is represented
for the union for purposes of collective bargaining, whether or not the employee belongs
to the union. Thus, all employees benefit (or suffer) from the contracts negotiated by
the union.
46. See Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1959 (1991).
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shop." '4 This opinion, and others like it, have encouraged what one
Supreme Court justice has characterized as "give-it-a-try litigation, '4
prompting nonmembers (and employer dominated associations like the
National Right to Work Committee) to file actions challenging virtually
every expenditure the union makes.
One response by unions has been to quantify all those expenses that
are not chargeable, often by keeping time records and other accounts
of expenses incurred in activities which previous court decisions have
identified as nonchargeable. Unions then subtract this amount from total
expenses and assume that nonmembers have to pay their "fair share"
of the remaining sum. It was this method of computation that was at
issue in the two court of appeals opinions.
In Fort Wayne Education Ass'n. v. Aldrich,49 the third district
considered the union's challenge to a trial court order which compelled
the union to assess each member and nonmember a pro rata share of
the amount actually spent on bargaining. The court of appeals rejected
the trial court formula, noting that it had "consistently approved" a
calculation based on union dues, "less a pro rata share of non-assessable
expenses." 50 Nine days later, the second district issued its opinion in
Albro v. Indianapolis Education Ass'n.," expressly rejecting the Aldrich
approach.
Although Judge Shields' opinion recognized that the Aldrich ap-
proach was supported by precedent (indeed, the court even cited Aldrich),
it concluded that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Lenhert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n.12 compelled a different calculation. 3 Rather than
compute non-chargeable expenses and deduct them from total expen-
ditures, the court said the union has the burden of affirmatively proving
chargeable expenses.' 4 The previous methodology, the court said, "ef-
fectively shifts the burden of proof [of chargeable expenses] onto the
nonunion members of the bargaining unit."" An admission that certain
expenses are nonchargeable does not compel a conclusion that the re-
maining expenditures are appropriately charged to nonmembers.
In June, the supreme court granted transfer on the consolidated
Aldrich and Albro cases and adopted the Albro opinion authored by
47. Id. at 1952.
48. Id. at 1975 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. 585 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
50. Id. at 9.
51. 585 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
52. 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).





Judge Shields . 6 This action works a significant change in the meth-
odology unions must use in order to calculate their fair share fees. In
Albro, the court of appeals said that Lenhert "distilled" a standard in
which the "paramount consideration... is whether the particular expense
can be proved to be chargeable."57 In the future, unions must affir-
matively prove that each expenditure satisfies the Lenhert criteria, a
requirement that will add significantly to the union's burden. Whether
this increased standard of proof will add appreciably to the constitutional
protections afforded non-member employees is debatable. It will, how-
ever, insure further litigation and more cost, thereby serving the interests
of those who oppose the imposition of service fees on free riders.
E. Covenants Not to Compete
Employers sometimes add extra incentive to employee non-compe-
tition agreements by requiring the employees to repay training expenses
should they quit and accept employment with a competitor. It was this
kind of clause that was at issue in Brunner v. Hand Industries, Inc.58
Brunner worked for a company, Hand, that performed finishing work
on orthopedic appliances. The employment agreement acknowledged that
because Hand had expended considerable sums in training him, Brunner
would repay a portion of his training costs if he resigned within three
years of employment and accepted employment with a competitor. The
reimbursement amounts were set forth in a schedule in the agreement.
After approximately twenty-eight months with Hand, Brunner resigned
and took a job with a competitor. Hand then filed suit seeking $20,000,
the amount provided by the schedule. Hand recovered in the trial court,
less a deduction for unpaid wages.59
Because the reimbursement provisions of the contract applied only
to former employees who accepted employment with a competitor, the
court classified it as a covenant in restraint of trade and said it was
subject to heightened scrutiny.60 Such covenants are protected only if
they reasonably protect the employer's interest without unreasonably
restricting the activities of employees. 61
Although an employer has a legitimate interest in preventing an
employee from exploiting confidential business information or otherwise
appropriating the employer's good will, both Indiana and other juris-
56. 594 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. 1992).
57. Albro, 585 N.E.2d at 670.
58. 603 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).





dictions have held that employees cannot be prevented from transferring
to another work place skills and abilities developed with an employer.
62
A contrary rule could seriously interfere with an employee's ability to
make a living, because most employers could claim that employees
perfected their skills through the work experience.
The court noted that Brunner had received short term training in
polishing and finishing orthopedic appliances, a skill he no doubt honed
in his twenty-eight months of employment. Even so, there was no evidence
that he had access to confidential business information, such as customer
lists or trade secrets.6" He took nothing to the competitor, then, except
his own abilities, albeit Hand had incurred the expense of perfecting
them.
The court was also influenced by what appeared to be unreasonable
reimbursement requirements, given Hand's wage rates. The jobs at issue
were not particularly lucrative, paying between $5.50 and $9.50 an hour.
The court said that the reimbursement levels, which ranged from $2200
to $20,000, could exceed an employee's actual earnings and were likely
to constitute one-half to two-thirds of an employee's total pay.6
Despite the court's discussion of the unreasonable reimbursement
amounts, it is not clear that this factor was essential to its decision.
The opinion appears broader in scope and seems to say that employee
mobility cannot be restricted merely by transfer of job skills from one
work place to another. Rather, the employee must transport something
that is uniquely the employer's, like trade secrets or customer lists, before
a restrictive covenant will be enforced.
II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES
A. 1991 Civil Rights Act
In Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co. (Mozee III),65
the court considered the retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.6
The case at issue had been pending since 1977 and had been the subject
of two previous Seventh Circuit opinions. 67 In the second opinion, Mozee
II, the court remanded to the district court certain questions concerning
62. See, e.g., Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235 (1955).
63. Brunner, 603 N.E.2d at 160.
64. Id. at 160-61.
65. 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Mozee ll.
66. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
67. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir.
1991) [hereinafter Mozee I]; Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the plaintiffs' Title VII claims. 6 Both parties filed a petition for rehearing,
and while they were pending, Congress passed the 1991 Act. The question
at issue in Mozee III was twofold: (1) whether the 1991 Act applies
retroactively on appeal, so that it might affect the court's decision in
Mozee II; and (2) whether it applies to the issues remanded, which really
means whether the Act applies retroactively to conduct or actions that
predated it.
Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs contended that Congress intended the
1991 Act to be retroactive, and the defendant argued a contrary con-
clusion. Moreover, both pointed to various portions of the legislative
history to support their contentions. The court, however, rebuffed any
attempt to decide the issue on the basis of such evidence. Calling the
language of the Act "hopelessly ambiguous," 69 the court concluded
"[w]hether Congress intended prospective or retroactive application of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act cannot be deciphered from either the language
of the statue or from the legislative history."7 0 Unable to resolve the
question through the statute or its history, the court turned to "judicially
derived rules of construction."'"
The court acknowledged that the judicial path was not free of
obstructions. Until 1968, the Seventh Circuit said that the Supreme Court
had always assumed statutes were to be applied prospectively. Then, in
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,72 the Court applied the opposite
presumption, albeit without offering much explanation for its change in
direction. The Court subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to Thorpe
in 1974,'7 then apparently reversed course eight years later, 74 and since
then has applied one rule or the other from "two seemingly contradictory
lines of cases." '75 The Seventh Circuit said its task was the difficult one
of reconciling these two lines of decision "in a manner that comports
with the policies underlying the need for prospective versus retroactive
application.' '76
The court decided that the presumption of prospective application
embodied in the Supreme Court's 1988 opinion in Bowen v. Georgetown
68. Mozee 11, 940 F.2d at 1055.
69. Mozee II, 963 F.2d at 933. The court's characterization applied to § 402(a),
which provides that the Act "shall take effect upon enactment." Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 402(a).
70. Mozee 11, 963 F.2d at 932.
71. Id. at 934.
72. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
73. See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
74. See United States V. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).




University Hospital7 stated the general rule. The other line of cases,
the court said, had more general applicability. After painstaking analysis
of the Supreme Court's opinions, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the fairer rule "is to hold parties accountable for only those acts that
were in violation of the law at the time the acts were performed. 78
The Bowen presumption applies, the court said, to matters of both
substance and procedure, both in issues on appeal and those that were
remanded to the trial court. 79 Judge Cudahy dissented, commenting that
the majority's protracted analysis of Supreme Court cases was 'thorough,
but ... mechanical." 80
This opinion will not end the controversy. As the Seventh Circuit
recognized, numerous other courts have considered the same issue, and
their conclusions diverge. Ultimately, then, the Supreme Court will have
to address the matter, no doubt parsing the same opinions the Seventh
*Circuit struggled with in this case.8
B. National Labor Relations Act Cases
One of the more interesting cases from the Seventh Circuit in 1992
was Judge Posner's opinion in Chicago Tribune v. NLRB.2 The dispute
involved the union's request for the names of permanent replacements
hired by the employer following a strike that began in 1985. The union
claimed it wanted the names in order to verify employment, so that it
could determine how many places were left for strikers. The employer
refused, citing a pattern of violence against the replacement workers.
Instead, it offered two alternatives: giving the names to an accounting
firm that could verify employment, or furnishing the union with the
replacements' birthdate and a partial Social Security number. The union
declined the compromise, resting its claim on a line of NLRB cases that
gave it a presumptive right to such information, absent an employer
showing of a "clear and present danger. 83
Judge Posner recognized that even the Seventh Circuit had described
the Board's position as a "settled rule," but cautioned that it should
not be taken literally. He characterized the union's request as nothing
more than a discovery request, opined that no statute gave the union
a right to the information, and said:
77. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
78. Mozee III, 963 F.2d at 936.
79. Id. at 935-36.
80. Id. at 940.
81. The Court will not take on the task in Mozee III, having denied certiorari.
Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992).
82. 965 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 246.
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Where the Board got the idea that a union's demand for the
names of replacement workers is to be handled not like any
other discovery request but by placing on the company an in-
superable burden of proving the union will in fact use the
information to harass workers beats us. 4
Although his rhetoric is folksy, if not clever, Judge Posner's law
may need some work. The union's request was not a mere discovery
device. Further it is inaccurate to say that no statute entitles the union
to the names of replacement workers. Although no one could presume
to speak for the Board, it may have "got the idea" that the presumption
ran in the union's favor from the Supreme Court and the National
Labor Relations Act. In NLRB v. Truitt _Manufacturing Co.,85 the
Supreme Court held that section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires the employer
to furnish on request information that is important to the bargaining
process.8 6 Although the right is not without limits, 7 Truitt has been
understood to mean that the employer has the burden of establishing
that the information the union requests is privileged or irrelevant.8 "
Posner does not even cite Truitt, the principal Supreme Court case
on the subject. Rather, in mischaracterizing the tenor of the union's
request, he refers only to NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,89 which dealt
with the union's right to information in contract enforcement proceedings
like arbitration, where the request might be more comparable to discovery
than what was at issue in Chicago Tribune.
The effect of Chicago Tribune is to hold that a union which is
obligated by law to act as exclusive representative for the replacement
workers is not even entitled to discover their identity. The court concluded
that the union's rejection of the employer-offered alternatives "suggests"
that it wanted the names to harass the workers, directly or indirectly.
Perhaps, however, the union wanted the names so it could solicit mem-
bership among the replacements who became members of the bargaining
unit the minute they were hired. The court is able to ignore this possibility
by neatly dividing the case into two distinct components.
The last part of the opinion deals with the union's loss of majority
status after the replacement workers were hired. A recent opinion of
the Supreme Court refused to presume that strike replacements do not
84. Id. at 247.
85. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
86. Id. at 155.
87. See, e.g., Detroit Edison v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
88. See, e.g., JuLrus G. GEN & BERTRAND E.. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS:
THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1988).
89. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
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support the union. 90 In Chicago Tribune the court noted that the union's
support had eroded by mid 1987, and it approved the employer's refusal
to execute a contract even though it acknowledged that the union had
accepted the offer. 9' In doing so, Posner stepped a little clumsily over
one of the Seventh Circuit's own cases, 92 but he professed to be guided
by the interests of employees. 93
Perhaps the union did want to harass the strike replacements; or
perhaps, as the employer suggested, its only interest in the Tribune
bargaining unit was the tactical advantage it might obtain for other
employees working for a different newspaper. However, there is danger
in allowing employers to assert the best interest of their employees,
which in employers' eyes are too often tied to nonunion workplaces,
exactly the outcome of this case. The replacements might have spurned
the union in any event, but this decision gives the employer yet another
weapon in the decertification arsenal. Not only can it hire replacement
workers for economic strikers, it can now effectively deprive the union
of any opportunity to contact these employees it represents, thus virtually
assuring their rejection of representation in any subsequent election or
poll.
Equally disturbing is Judge Posner's opinion in Graphics Commu-
nications International Union Local 508 v. NLRB,1 in which the em-
ployer, Nielson Lithographing Co., had also replaced striking workers.
In 1983, the company entered collective bargaining by demanding seventy-
six concessions from the union that were intended to reduce labor costs.
The employer said it needed the concessions "to compete," because
costs were "prohibitive," and "the company is making a profit ...
[but] couldn't compete." 9 There is no mystery about why it framed its
justification in this manner.
In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,9 the employer resisted a
union's wage demands by pleading that meeting them would break the
company. 97 The union requested that the employer furnish information
substantiating its claim, and filed a section 8(a)(5) charge when the
employer refused. The Supreme Court enforced the Board's order to
disclose, saying:
90. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
91. Chicago Tribune v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 244, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1992).
92. See Continental Web Press, Inc., v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
93. Chicago Tribune, 965 F.2d at 250.
.94. 977 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1992).
95. Id. at 1169.
96. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
97. Id. at 150.
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Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by
either bargainer be honest claims. This is true about an asserted
inability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument is
important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining,
it is important enough to require some proof of its accuracy. 9
Finding an obvious parallel between the employer in Truitt, who had
resisted a wage increase, and Nielsen Lithographing, which had asked
for a decrease, the union demanded that the employer open its financial
records for examination. The Seventh Circuit, for the second time in
four years, found that Truitt had no application."
In a previous decision, the court had said that Truitt applied only
in those instances in which an employer pleaded an inability to pay.
Nielsen had not overstepped that line, which apparently is bright to the
point of radiance. Nielsen did not say that it had to cut wages and
benefits because it couldn't afford to pay them. Rather, "[a]ll that
Nielsen was claiming was that if it didn't do anything about its labor
costs it would continue to lose business and layoff workers. It didn't
claim that it was in any financial trouble."'0 Part of the problem,
Posner said, was that Nielsen used to enjoy a competitive advantage
due to superior equipment. 10' However, as competitors acquired the same
equipment and presumably the same production efficiencies, Nielsen's
comparatively higher wages put it at a disadvantage.0 2
No one could doubt the competency of Nielsen's legal advice or,
for that matter, the gullibility of the Seventh Circuit. Its desire to cut
wages, Nielsen said, was really a desire to "protect the jobs of our
employees.''103 The court swallowed this, apparently without a grimace.
Relying, no doubt, on his considerable expertise in economics, Posner
declared that the employer could simply "minimize its costs at a lower
volume of output."'' 4 That is, rather than lose money, the employer
would just control costs by cutting jobs. However, even if it got down
98. Id. at 152-53.
99. A full review of the case's history is beyond the scope of this Article. The
Seventh Circuit had first considered that matter in 1988, following the Board's order that
the employer disclose the information. The court refused to enforce, Nielson Litho Co.
v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988), relying on its decision in NLRB v. Harvstone
Mfg. Corp., 785 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1986). Properly chastened, the Board reversed course,
305 NLRB No. 90 (1991). The employer then sought review of the Board's decision.




103. Id. at 1169.
104. Id. at 1170.
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to one percent of its regular output, the firm might still be profitable,
albeit fairly vacant. Whether the employer followed this course or not
was none of the union's business, the court said, citing First National
Maintenance v. NLRB.'°0
The effect of this decision is clear. Rather than saying that continuing
at the present level of operations without a wage cut could cause it to
lose money, the employer said the same thing but with a different spin.
It could not continue at the same level of wages without cutting em-
ployees. This, the court declared, made all the difference in the world.
Because the union has no right to bargain over decisions to decrease
the work force, the court decided there was no duty to furnish information
about such plans. Even with such a duty, the union knew that other
companies were becoming more productive, which was the real cause
of Nielsen's woes. One must wonder whether any employer will ever
again be so foolish as to plead inability to pay. Now employers can
avoid the effects of Truitt merely by professing a concern for employees'
jobs rather than shareholders' profits.
Judge Posner also authored the opinion in another case involving
the Chicago Tribune, Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB. '°6 During the term
of a collective bargaining agreement, the employer unilaterally adopted
a drug and alcohol policy that governed employees both on and off the
work place. Employees suspected of use or impairment on the job could
be forced to assent to blood or urine tests. The employer claimed that
its action was justified by a management's right clause that read, in
pertinent part, "except as expressly limited by the express language of
this agreement ... the company has and retains exclusively to itself
... the exclusive right ... to establish and enforce reasonable rules
and regulations relating to the operation of its facilities and to employee
conduct." 0 7
Although the management rights clause was not unusual, another
provision of the contract is not typically found in collective bargaining
agreements, at least outside the printing industry. The parties agreed
that the "general laws" of the international union would "govern re-
lations between the parties on those subjects concerning which no pro-
vision is made in the agreement."'0 8 One such "law" provided that
"[nlo journeyman shall be required to submit to a physical examination
as a condition of employment."'09
105. 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act does
not require an employer to bargain with the union representing its employees over decisions
to close part of the business).
106. 974 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1992).





The NLRB held that unilateral implementation of the drug and
alcohol rule violated section 8(a)(5).1 0 The panel majority said the re-
quirement to submit to testing conflicted with the "law" that forbade
physical examination of journeymen and was, therefore, a unilateral
midterm contract modification."' Although employees who used drugs
off the job were not subject to testing, the portion of the rule dealing
with them also violated section 8(a)(5). The consequence of off duty
drug use is a mandatory subject for bargaining, the Board said, and
the employer could not act unilaterally without first bargaining with the
union. The general language in the management rights clause was not
sufficient to relinquish the union's right to bargain since it was not a
clear and unmistakable waiver." 2
As the Board had done as well, the Seventh Circuit debated whether
drug testing was a "physical examination" within the meaning of the
contract. Judge Posner had his doubts, declaring that a "physical exami-
nation" is the "ensemble" and not its separate parts, any more than part
of an atom is itself an atom.' Although such nit-picking could obviously
lead to absurd results, the court seemed more interested in substance than
form. Thus, Posner recognized that the "purpose" of the language was
to protect jobs, not define medical procedures. As such, medical testing
would presumably fit within the term "physical examination." ' 4
Nevertheless, the court found the general law prohibiting physical
examinations to have no application. Posner's opinion observes that the
general laws apply only when a subject is not otherwise covered in the
labor contract."' Although there was nothing in the agreement about
management's right to impose testing or otherwise regulate drug or
alcohol use, the management rights clause said the employer had the
"exclusive right ... to establish and enforce reasonable rules ... relating
to ... employee conduct.""' 6 The court said it had "no doubt" that
the drug and alcohol policy was such a rule." 7
110. Id. at 934 (citing Chicago Tribune Co., 304 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 138 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1065 (Aug. 27, 1991)).
Ill. Chicago Tribune Co., 304 NLRB No. 62, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) (Aug. 27,
1991), slip op. at 3. Although the reach of the NLRA's requirement that the parties
bargain in good faith is beyond the scope of this article, the Board has held that an
employer violates section 8(a)(5) when it modifies a contract unilaterally during its term.
See generally GETUAN & POGREBIN, supra note 88, at 133-34.
112. Chicago Tribune Co., 304 NLRB No. 62, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (Aug.
27, 1991), slip op. at 3.
113. Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 974 F.2d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1992).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 937.
117. Id. The court noted that the union argued to the contrary, a contention Posner
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This characterization of the employer's rule effectively decided the
case. The general law, the court said, was a "gap filler.""' However,
there was no gap to be filled. The management rights clause gave the
employer "carte blanche to impose rules relating to employee conduct.""19
Because the contract specifically allowed the employer to promulgate
rules, including rules requiring drug and alcohol testing, there was no
occasion to apply the general law. It was preempted by the express terms
of the contract.
The court also rejected the union's challenge to the off duty rules,
where testing was not a factor. 20 Indeed, the rule allowed discharge of
any employee arrested (not convicted) for illegal activity related to drugs
and alcohol.'' Without commenting about whether this provision was
reasonable, the court said that its unilateral implementation was not an
unlawful refusal to bargain. 22 It questioned the Board's assertion that
waiver of a statutory right-like the right to bargain-must be "clear
and unmistakable."'2 Even if this standard applied, however, it was
satisfied.
The parties agreed to a provision that allowed the employer to
promulgate reasonable rules and the language they used did not distin-
guish between on the job and off the job activity. Rather, they used
broad language that must be interpreted in light of ordinary contract
principles. There is, the court said, no rule that tilts the decision toward
the union. The only question is what the contract means, a determination
not necessarily within the Board's area of expertise. 24 The court held
that the Board had misconstrued the contract, which it found sufficient
to waive the union's right to bargain. 25
The implications of this decision are surely disturbing to unions.
There was nothing very special about the management rights clause the
parties negotiated. Versions of the same language appear, no doubt, in
thousands of collective bargaining agreements. Even without this boil-
erplate, most labor professionals would concede that the employer has
the right to implement reasonable rules to govern the work place. But
the ordinary understanding-recognized expressly in the management
said "we barely understand." Id. at 935. The union's argument is not explained in the
opinion.
118. Id.




123. Id. at 936.




rights clause itself-is that such general grants of authority do not override
specific provisions.
The court, however, found a loophole in the specific provision at
issue here. The general laws are to apply only in those instances in
which the parties had not otherwise bargained language. 26 Of course,
they bargained no language about either drug testing or physical ex-
aminations, both common subjects addressed in labor negotiations. All
they did was agree to boilerplate that allowed the company to promulgate
rules. One must question why this imprecise proclamation of a generally
recognized authority should outweigh a specific restriction on the treat-
ment of journeymen employees.
In its zeal to protect employer prerogatives, the court got it back-
wards. The question was not whether the restriction on examinations
should apply. Rather, as the NLRB found, the issue was whether a
general management rights clause repudiated a protection that the parties
did not need to put in the agreement, because it was already in the
general laws they had incorporated by reference.
No doubt the court was influenced by the same consideration that
motivated member Oviatt to dissent from his colleagues' NLRB opinion.127
The employer's policy is in line with the national policy against unlawful
drug use. However, employers have no power to implement such policies
in ways that violate employee rights bargained under the protection of
federal law. Moreover, there is nothing in the court's opinion that limits
it to matters of important national interests. To the contrary, Posner
said the employer had carte blanche to implement reasonable rules,
presumably no matter what the general laws provide. The rules, of
course, could not violate a specific provision of the agreement, but
following this opinion, the general laws do not constitute such provisions.
They yield to the management rights clause.
The decision pays little heed to the bargaining history between the
parties. One must ask, however, whether the parties deferred to the
general laws when they negotiated their contract. That is, if the general
laws dealt with a specific problem-physical examinations, for example-
the parties may have elected to omit any such reference in the agreement
itself. They had already agreed to be bound by the general laws unless
the contract said otherwise. The court's opinion, however, virtually
nullifies any subject in the general laws that might conceivably become
a rule regulating the work place or employer conduct, a broad spectrum
indeed. In that event, the management rights clause did more than give
126. Id. at 935.




the employer the right to make rules. It erased those protections the
parties had negotiated but codified only in the general laws.
C. Age Discrimination Cases
Other civil rights statutes intended to protect certain classes have
sometimes been interpreted to prohibit so-called reverse discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,121 for example, has been held
applicable to suits filed by whites or by men.1 29 The plaintiffs in Hamilton
v. Caterpillar, Inc.,130 tried unsuccessfully to raise what the court char-
acterized as a reverse discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).' 3' The ADEA protects employees who are
at least forty years old from discrimination.' 32 Each of the plaintiffs in
Caterpillar was part of the protected class.'33 They complained that an
early retirement program created to temper the effects of plant closings
unlawfully excluded them, because it applied only to employees who
were at least fifty years old. 4
The court tipped its hand early in the opinion when it characterized
the claim as "more than a little bizarre.""' In fact, however, the plaintiffs
could rely not only on the interpretation of other statutes but also on
a regulation promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC): "It is unlawful in situations where this Act applies,
for an employer to discriminate . . . by giving preference because of
age between individuals 40 and over."' 3 6 The employer had done exactly
that. The plaintiffs alleged that they had the requisite service to qualify
for early retirement, but had been denied only because of their age."3
The court noted that there was also some "arguable support" in
the wording of the statute.'38 Thus, congress legislated against "arbitrary
age discrimination"'' 3 9 and against a denial of employment opportunities
128. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-a to -17 (1988).
129. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
130. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 1226 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1988)).
132. The prohibition against age discrimination is found in 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988).
The age limitation is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988).
133. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 29 C.F.R. 1625.2(a) (1991). The regulation goes on to provide the following
example: "[1]f two people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the other 52,
the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must make
such decision on the basis of some other factor." Id.
137. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1226.
138. Id. at 1228.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
[Vol. 26:1065
EMPLOYMENT LAW
or benefits "because of ... [an] individual's age."'' 1 The court, however,
found such language merely to reflect a congressional concern that
"discriminating against older people on the basis of their age is arbi-
trary." ' 14' Despite what it called the lack of "graceful" language in the
statute, the court discerned no congressional intent to "open the flood-
gates to attacks on every retirement plan." 42 Congress intended to protect
"older workers," not those who were denied employment opportunities
"because they were too young."' 4
3
Although the court's decision may be justifiable, the issue is more
difficult than the court's opinion indicates. No where in the brief opinion
does the court confront directly the fact that the plaintiffs were part
of the class the ADEA was intended to protect. To that extent, the
analogy the court drew to other civil rights legislation was inapt. Thus,
the court said that if Title VII expressly limited potential plaintiffs to
women and minorities, a court could not read it to authorize actions
by men or by whites. That is, no reverse discrimination actions would
be possible. The ADEA, the court noted, limited its protection to those
age forty or older.1' 4 From this the court concluded that there was no
congressional intent to provide protection for younger workers:
There is nothing to suggest that Congress believed age to be the
equal of youth in the sense that the races and sexes are deemed
equal .. . .If the Act were really meant to prevent reverse age
discrimination, limiting the protected classes to those 40 and
above would make little sense.1 45
The difficulty with this analysis is the court's characterization of
the plaintiffs' claim as one of reverse discrimination. 1 Typically that
label has been applied to cases in which a majority member of a class
is disadvantaged by efforts to protect or promote minority members.
In such cases, the term "reverse discrimination" recognizes that even
though the plaintiff is not a member of the class the legislation was
intended to benefit, he or she may. nonetheless suffer when decisions
are made on the basis of some prohibited factor. This was not true in
Caterpillar. Judge Cudahy wrote the opinion as if the plaintiffs were
outside the protection of the Act; as though a group of thirty-something
140. Id. § 623 (1988).
141. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1226.




yuppies was whining about exclusion from the retirement plan. That
would have been a claim of reverse discrimination.
The court's conclusion that the ADEA evidences no intent to protect
young workers may be correct, but it has no application whatever to
the case the court decided. The plaintiffs, in fact, were members of the
protected class and their allegation was that they were excluded from
benefits solely on the basis of their age, an assertion that would seem
to have considerable merit. The issue, then, is not whether the ADEA
allows reverse discrimination actions. Rather, the issue is whether the
ADEA allows employers to make distinctions between members of the
protected class when it allocates scarce resources on the basis of age.
Perhaps the employer's retirement plan was protected by the Act's
bona fide employee benefit provision., 47 Perhaps some provision of the
ADEA allows such distinctions. Although what happened to plaintiffs
seems unfair, it is not easy to distinguish their action from one attacking
any retirement plan, which typically impose minimum age limits on
retirement. Whatever the justification, little can be said in defense of
the court's opinion. It should have confronted the issue before it rather
than pretending that the plaintiffs were somehow excluded from the
rights Congress expressly gave them.
Another questionable age discrimination case is Finnegan v. Trans
World Airlines, 48 in which the court found the disparate impact theory
inapplicable to a benefit reduction that fell most heavily on older workers.
In response to heavy losses, TWA cut benefits of nonunion workers by
reducing wages fourteen percent and by capping vacations at four weeks. 49
Before this change workers with at least sixteen years service were
apparently entitled to more than four weeks, up to a high of seven
weeks after thirty years service. Most employees with more than sixteen
years employment, and all of those who had worked for TWA more
than thirty years, were within the class of workers protected by the
ADEA. 10 Although the opinion does not fully recite the effects of the
reduction, apparently no employee with fewer than sixteen years of
service had her vacation reduced. Thus, employees with two or three
weeks vacation were not affected by the change.
Although the plaintiffs, all employees age forty or older, tendered
a claim of disparate treatment, 151 their primary contention was grounded
147. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988).
148. 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
149. Id. at 1161.
150. Id.
151. The employer had an early retirement plan available to older workers and
plaintiffs urged that the vacation reduction was intended to goad employees into accepting
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in disparate impact theory, defined adeptly by Judge Posner as follows:
"[I]f an employment practice bears disproportionately against the mem-
bers of a protected group, the employer ought to be required to justify
it.""' Obviously, the reduction in vacation benefits fell most heavily-
perhaps almost exclusively-on older workers, because they were the
ones most likely to have long service. The district court granted summary
judgment, holding that any disparate impact was justified by section
4(f)(2) of the ADEA,5 3 which shields the impact of bona fide seniority
systems or bona fide employee benefit plans.
In dicta, the court opined that section 4(f)(2) was inapplicable.1 4 It
questioned whether the seniority provision had any application to the
action at issue, and it noted that even TWA did not argue that the
reductions were protected as part of a benefit plan.'" These observations
were dicta, however, because the court said that disparate impact theory
did not apply to the case at all.'5 6 Indeed, the court even questioned
whether disparate impact theory applied under the ADEA, though it
recognized that the "weight of authority" was to the contrary 5 7 Even
if it applies, however, the court said the case "makes no sense in
disparate impact terms."'5 8
Disparate impact theory, the court said, was intended to force em-
ployers to justify a facially neutral employment practice that adversely
affected a protected group.5 9 Such theories could not be applied to
benefit reductions, where virtually any reduction would affect older
employees more severely than their younger counterparts. '6 Across the
board wage decreases, for example, would likely affect older workers
more because their wages are probably higher; reductions in dental
insurance would similarly fall on older employees because their teeth
are probably worse.' 61 Nor could a benefit like vacation be reduced
that option. Judge Posner said this theory was "implausibly Machiavellian." Id. at 1165.
Without the benefit of any evidence (the trial court had granted summary judgment)
about the value employees placed on extended vacation opportunities, the court said the
employer's action was "not likely" to influence employees to retire. Id. Judge Posner's
opinion also questions whether the plaintiffs had sufficient evidence to prove illicit motive,
a matter that might also have been illuminated by a trial. Id.
152. Id. at 1163.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
154. Finnegan, 967 F.2d at 1163.
155. Id. at 1162.





161. Id. at 1164.
19931
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
proportionately. A three-sevenths reduction in the two week vacation of
a younger employee would leave her with only six days, which would
make it difficult for the employer to retain its workforce. 62 (The court
did not explain how it arrived at this factual finding in the absence of
any evidence.) Four weeks vacation, on the other hand, was "generous"
and apparently unlikely to discourage senior employees. 163 There was
simply no way to "maintain a rational system of paid vacations" without
cutting senior employees more than junior ones.'"
Disparate impact, the court explained, was intended to remove dis-
criminatory policies that had developed from "inertia or insensitivity." 16
5
The theory also helped to ferret out practices that had been adopted
originally in support of intentional discrimination. 16 These situations,
however, were a "far cry" from that faced by the court.' 67 Though
TWA's benefit reduction fell more heavily on older workers, it was not
the result of insensitivity or a remnant of previous discrimination. 168
Rather, it was simply not possible to cut vacation benefits without forcing
older workers to bear the brunt of the reduction. 169 Any other result
would force the company to "balance its books on the backs of the
younger workers." 170
One might question the court's gloomy assessment of the effect of
a proportional reduction on younger employees. One might even suggest
that if the employer is put to a choice between hurting the young or
the old, Congress has mandated that the old should be protected. In
any event, the court should at least have been honest in its assessment
of the issue. The arguments supporting the employer's position sound
more like a business justification for adverse impact than an argument
that the theory simply doesn't apply. The court may have thought so
too.
Judge Posner acknowledged that the court could have found an
adverse impact with compelling business justification but that "would
mean that every time an employer made an across the board cut in
wages he was prima facie violating the age discrimination law."',7' That













might be forced to prove they were justified. The court, at least, was
forthright about this unabashed deference to employer prerogatives.
Although only a preliminary opinion, Fisher v. Transco Services-
Milwaukee7 2 might serve as a warning to employers who plan to im-
plement standardized productivity measurements that adversely affect
older workers. The case arose after Transco instituted a computerized
"Measured Day Work Program," which measured the performance of
certain employees. The program evaluated the time it took for these
employees to complete certain work tasks and compared it to computer
generated standards. Those who fell within the bottom twenty percent
of the measured group (which included fifty-two employees) were subject
to a progressive discipline scheme that culminated in discharge. The two
plaintiffs, both in their forties, were among eleven employees fired during
the forty-eight week duration of the program. Ten of the eleven ter-
minated workers were age forty or older.
Plaintiffs claimed discrimination under both disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories, but the trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant.' The court of appeals first considered the case under
disparate treatment, holding that plaintiffs had created a genuine issue
of material fact about whether the program was a pretext for age
discrimination. 74 Of more interest is the disparate impact theory, which
the court noted was "the least developed aspect of the case.'
Although the program was facially neutral, plaintiffs claimed that
it affected older workers more harshly than others, pointing to the fact
that ten of the eleven employees fired under the program were over
forty. While it recognized the difficulty of generalizing from such small
statistical samples, the court observed that when ten of twenty-seven
older workers were terminated, as compared to only one of twenty-five
younger workers, "it does not require expertise in differential equations
to observe that an adverse ratio of ten to one is disproportionate."'176
This discrepancy created a material issue of fact that will have to be
"fully developed at trial."' 7 7 Similarly, the court said there was a material
issue about whether the program, whose administration had been replete
with errors and which had been abandoned after forty-eight weeks, was
a business necessity sufficient to overcome the adverse impact. 7 1
172. 979 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 1239.
174. Id. at 1244.
175. Id.





Whether or not plaintiffs marshall sufficient evidence to prevail at
their new trial, this decision signals the court's willingness to evaluate
the effect of productivity devices, and perhaps new technology and new
work patterns, on older workers. The plaintiffs in Transco were only
forty-two and forty-five at the time of their discharge. Suppose, however,
they had been sixty-five or older. Can an employer standardize pro-
ductivity requirements based on the abilities of younger workers or must
it accommodate those who cannot keep pace due to age? Similar issues
arise under some cooperative ventures where employees are expected to
perform a range of duties which had previously been allocated to separate
classifications. If .an older worker can perform some, but not all of
these functions, can she be terminated?
Transco does not answer these questions. It counsels caution, how-
ever, for employers who would standardize requirements without regard
to how the abilities of their employees are affected by such factors as
age and disability.
D. Title VII
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
v. Ward'9 grew out of the Illinois Department of Employment Security's
decision to lay off employees by concentrating the impact in offices
heavily populated by blacks. An internal adverse impact analysis dem-
onstrated that, by focusing the layoffs on Chicago area offices, 8.6%
of the department's black workers were laid off, compared to only 3%
of its white employees.8 0 This was sufficient to trigger the EEOC's so-
called four-fifths standard, which questions selection procedures that
produce discrepancies between blacks and whites of greater than one-
fifth.'"' The department reacted by calculating the effect of the layoff
on the rate of retention by race, instead of the rate of layoff. As the
court observed, this "number juggling" had no real effect on the layoff,
but it did avoid the four-fifths rule.18 2
The employees' union and a separate class of black employees sued,
claiming intentional discrimination under Title VII,' s3 under § 1981,' 4
179. 978 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1992).
180. Id. at 375.
181. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1991).
182. Ward, 978 F.2d at 375. Under a layoff analysis, 3%0 of white employees were
laid off, as compared to 8.6%0 of black employees, meaning that the number of white
employees accounted for only 35% of the layoff. Under a retention analysis, black employees
were retained at 94% of the rate of white employees. Id.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
184. Id. § 1981.
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and under § 1983. '" The plaintiffs' Title VII claim also asserted that
the layoff procedure had an adverse impact on black employees. The
district court dismissed the claim of intentional discrimination, holding
the plaintiffs had failed to allege "well pleaded facts that would give
rise to an inference" of intentional discrimination.'8 6 The case then
proceeded on the disparate impact theory with the trial court ultimately
granting summary judgment for defendants. 8 7 The court found that
plaintiffs had failed to identify a "specific employment practice" that
produced an adverse impact. 8 Such a practice, the trial court said,
must be a "repeated, customary method of operation," a definition the
protested layoff could not satisfy.189
The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court on both issues. It did
not dawdle over the disparate treatment theory, observing simply that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only a "short and plain
statement" of the claim.1'9 An identification of the protested layoffs
and an allegation that the defendants had acted "knowingly, intentionally,
and maliciously" was sufficient. 91 The court then turned to the disparate
impact theory where, it noted, there is "precious little case law on the
meaning of employment practice."' 92
Title VII outlaws any "employment practice" that discriminates on
the basis of race.' 93 Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs v.
Duke Power,'94 plaintiffs have been able to claim discrimination regardless
of an employer's intent by alleging that an employment practice adversely
affects a member of a protected class. The court observed that the
"enumerated acts" of Title VII ("to hire ... to discharge ... or
otherwise to discriminate against"' 95 or "to limit, segregate or classify"' 96)
were employment practices, as that term was used in the statute, and
most of them could be referred to as "single decisions of an employer."' 97
Each of those single decisions would support a claim of intentional
185. Id. § 1983.
186. Ward, 978 F.2d at 376.
187. Id.
188. American Fed'n. of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Ward, 771 F.
Supp. 247, 251 (N.D. I1. 1991).
189. Id.
190. Ward, 978 F.2d at 376-77 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
191. Id. at 377.
192. Id.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
194. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
196. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
197. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373,
377 (7th Cir. 1992).
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discrimination and "it is difficult to see why the result should be any
different when the decision is challenged on the grounds of adverse
impact.'" 98
The court said the trial court had apparently confused adverse impact
theory with the "pattern or practice" cases that allow civil enforcement
suits by the attorney general.' Such cases, which require proof that an
employer "regularly and purposefully discriminates against a protected
group," demonstrate a method of proving intentional discrimination. 2°°
Once the government makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to show that it did not discriminate against a particular
employee. 20' This, the court said, was to be distinguished from proof
of an unlawful employment practice by adverse impact theory. 20 2
The court turned to what was undoubtedly the defendant's principal
concern. Previous adverse impact cases had largely been like Griggs, in
which an employer's work policies (e.g., the requirement that all em-
ployees have a high school diploma) have the effect of excluding more
black employees than white employees. Such practices, which apply
neutrally to all employees regardless of race, might nonetheless produce
a discriminatory impact. The single layoff decision in Ward, however,
was not necessarily reflective of an employment policy. It was an isolated
decision that just happened to hurt blacks more than whites. The de-
fendant's obvious fear, no doubt shared generally by employers, is the
extension of disparate impact to single employment decisions.
The discharge of a single employee who happens to be black, for
example, might produce an adverse impact. Similarly, an employer's
decision to eliminate a product line or close a plant might affect more
black workers than white workers. Such single decisions, however, would
ordinarily not be the result of an employment practice applied neutrally
to all employees. In the ordinary case, then, the decision could be
attacked only if the plaintiff could prove some intent to discriminate.
Presumably, the court's decision does not subject each isolated de-
cision to disparate impact analysis. Plaintiffs face significant difficulties
in establishing a prima facie case of adverse impact. Some groups may
be too small to yield valid statistical comparisons. Even if they do,
courts must take account of "common non-discriminatory reasons for
apparent disparities. '20 3 Nevertheless, "to the extent that members of a
protected class can show significant disparities stemming from a single
198. Id.
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decision . . . there is no reason why that decision should not be ac-
tionable." 20 Given the difficulties of proving intentional discrimination,
one might expect that plaintiffs will seize on Ward as an expansion of
disparate impact theory, thereby testing the trial court's prediction that
"every single act" of an employer will be reviewed for its adverse effect
on protected classes.
204. Id.

